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The Korean Supreme Court has held in the case of POSCO (2007) that subjective 
requirements such as anti-competitive intent or purpose must necessarily be considered before 
there can be any finding of abuse of market dominant position or of competition restraints effects 
in antitrust cases. However, this holding is not properly supported by legal theory or competition 
policy. 
When considering regulations governing the abuse of market dominant position pursuant 
to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU), the 
concept of abuse has an objective standard. Subjective requirements, such as anti-competitive 
intention, are not considered independently. The objective characteristics of the behavior in the 
relevant market are crucial in determining whether there is the abuse or not. Likewise, Section 2 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits both monopolies and attempts to monopolize, but while 
the subjective requirements of the alleged monopolistic behavior might be considered, this 
approach must be understood in terms of the different legal systems regulating the monopoly 
itself.
These issues are relevant to any determination of the illegality of a cartel in the aftermath of 
the POSCO decision. Article 101 in the TFEU refers explicitly to the purpose of competition 
restraints as a requirement for the regulations of cartels. However, the purpose in this article 
could be proved by nature, and where the effect of the competition restriction exists, the purpose 
of competition restraints could not be understood as an essential requirement. If the subjective 
requirements are essential to decide the illegality of a claim for abuse of market dominance under 
the POSCO rules, these requirements may pose a problem in establishing abuse.
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I. Introduction
Recently, questions have been raised regarding whether subjective 
requirements are required in deciding whether an alleged abuse of market 
dominant position is illegal under the Monopoly Regulations and Fair 
Trade Act (hereinafter MRFTA) and, if so, what meanings these 
requirements may have from the point of view of competition policy and 
legal theory. Such discussion has been stimulated by the 2007 POSCO 
holding1) of the Korean Supreme Court. The POSCO holding has received 
considerable attention from various legal scholars,2) primarily directed at 
the Court’s somewhat controversial views indicating that the subjective 
requirement is essential to the establishment of certain MRFTA violations. 
Specifically, the holding posits a subjective requirement such as 
economic intent or objective as a separate and independent element 
necessary to establish a refusal to deal as an illegal abuse of dominant 
market position. The holding also presents factors that could create a 
presumption that such subjective factors exist. The significance of this 
decision is undeniable, as it represents the first time the Court has 
addressed the legal significance of these subjective requirements in detail. 
However, the Court’s holding did not resolve all of the issues pertaining to 
such subjective requirements. There were many critical comments made 
about the holding, and it is unclear whether the POSCO ruling will 
continue to serve as precedent in the future, let along expand to the other 
types of offenses in the MRFTA.
Hereinafter, these subjective requirements will be discussed with 
respect to the violations of the MRFTA. First, the content and meanings of 
the POSCO case will be analyzed (II), and then, the case’s significance and 
legal validity will be critically examined (III). Next, the subjective 
requirements posited by the Court will be reviewed from the perspective of 
competition policy, and the need for both a review of this judgment and a 
reasonable approach towards the subjective requirement will be 
demonstrated (IV). Then, the question of whether such an analysis should 
1) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du8626, Nov. 11, 2007 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Posco Case]
2) See KWon ohseung, gyeongjebeob [economic LaW] 168-171 (Beobmunsa, 2015).
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be expanded to other types of antitrust offenses such as concerted conduct 
(i.e. cartel conduct) will discussed beyond the unilateral conduct (abuse of 
market dominant power and unfair trade practice) contemplated by the 
MRFTA. The question of how possible meanings might affect criminal 
antitrust law will also be discussed (Ⅴ). Finally, this paper will conduct a 
comparative review of Article 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and Article 1 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter TFEU) 
with regard to both unilateral conduct and concerted conduct. These 
provisions may take the legislative structure causing the discussion about 
the subjective requirements, so they will provide meaningful implications, 
even as discussing the subjective requirements of violations in MRFTA.
II. Analysis of the POSCO Case
1. Facts and Processes
POSCO was a business entity which participated in the production of 
steel throughout Korea. POSCO’s share of the direct production of cold-
rolled steel plate was estimated at 58.4% in the Korean market. Its share of 
the Korean market for production of the hot-rolled coil (which is required 
to produce cold-rolled steel plate) was 79.8%. Three other business entities 
were significantly involved in these markets. Hisco produced only cold-
rolled steel plate and held about 11.1% of that market. Dongbu, and 
Yeonhap respectively held a 13.7% and 7.9% market share in the hot-rolled 
coil market in 2000. Since 1997, Hisco, a subsidiary of Hyundai Motor 
Company, had requested several times for a supply of hot-rolled coil from 
POSCO. However, POSCO never supplied the hot-rolled coil to Hisco.
The issue before the Court was whether POSCO’s refusal to supply the 
hot-rolled coil to Hisco represented an abuse of market dominant power. 
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter KFTC) held that POSCO 
abused its market dominance in the hot-rolled coil market based on Article 
3-2, Clause 1 in the MRFTA because POSCO’s refusal to supply had 
hindered Hisco’s business.3) POSCO appealed to the Seoul High Court, 
3) KFTC Decision, 2001-068, Apr. 12, 2001 (S. Kor.).
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seeking a revocation of the KFTC’s decision, but that court affirmed the 
KFTC’s ruling.4) POSCO objected appealed to the Korean Supreme Court.
2. Judgment of the Supreme Court
The Korean Supreme Court agreed that POSCO’s refusal to deal with 
Hisco represented an abuse of market dominant power. Nevertheless, the 
Court overturned the lower court’s ruling and held that the effects of 
competition restraints arising solely from a refusal to deal are not sufficient 
to establish the illegality of the conduct. It is meaningful to adopt the 
analysis of the effects of competition restraints in this judgment,5) and it is 
also worth noting the Court’s comments on the subjective requirements. 
The Court said the following as part of its decision rejecting the illegality of 
refusal to deal: 
It is insufficient to acknowledge illegality of refusal to deal, in all 
cases market dominant undertakings refused to deal with an 
unreasonable intent or object to the other party or only by the facts 
that the other party suffered a disadvantage, such as to have the 
difficulties or be likely to be faced with the difficulties due to the 
refusal to deal. In particular, when the party who refuses to deal will 
have intents or objects to maintain or strengthen monopoly in 
market, namely to influence artificially market orders by restraining 
the free competition in the market, and objectively he will give a 
refusal to deal with characteristics evaluated as action raising a 
concern that the effects of competition restraints will appear, the 
illegality of the actions could be recognized.6) 
In other words, the Court found it necessary to consider independently 
both subjective and objective factors before finding an illegal refusal to deal.
4) Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2001Nu5370, Aug. 27, 2002.
5) See Lee Minho & Joo Hyunyung, Sijangjibaejeog Jiwi Namyonghaengwiui Budangseonge 
Gwanhan Yeongu [Unreasonableness in the Abuse of Market Dominance], 22 sabeob [Private LaW] 
104-105 (2012).
6) Posco Case, 2002Du8626, Nov. 11, 2007.
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The POSCO opinion also stated that: 
The defendant claiming that the refusal to deal of an undertaking 
in market dominant position falls under abuse of such position must 
prove that this action could bring about the effects of competition 
restraints, such as price rise, output reduction, inhibition of 
innovation, decrease of the number of viable competitors, decline of 
diversity and the subject of this action had the intent or object of 
such effects. If it is proved that the effects above mentioned 
appeared practically, it will be presumed in fact that there were 
concerns about the competition restraints from the undertaking’s 
conducts and an intent or object to restrict competition. If not, it 
must be decided whether this refusal to deal was a conduct that 
could cause the effects of competition restraints and the subject of 
the conduct had the intent or object of the effects, comprehensively 
considering the motive of refusal to deal, the way of the refusal, the 
characteristics of the relevant market, the degree of disadvantage 
that the counterparty has suffered due to the refusal, the changes in 
prices and output in the relevant market and inhibition of 
innovation and diversity.7) 
Ultimately, the Court held that for an abuse of a dominant market 
position to rise to the level of illegality, it must be shown in a concrete way 
that the purpose of the restriction of competition was subjectively as well as 
objectively in violation of the law.
III. Subjective Requirement of Single Conduct
1. The significance of POSCO
POSCO addressed whether “refusal to deal” was an abuse of market 
dominant position in the absence of other factors. Although POSCO 
7) Posco Case, 2002Du8626, Nov. 11, 2007.
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established the necessity of demonstrating that the subjective requirements 
in a “refusal to deal” case are met, it remains unclear whether such 
requirements must be met in other types of cases, including all “refusal to 
deal” cases, all exclusive abuses, all abuses including exploitative abuses, or 
all MRFTA violations in the widest scope. Because the content of the 
subjective requirements resulted in the restriction of competition under 
POSCO, the structures of illegality suggested by the ruling might be 
expected to encompass other MRFTA violations, particularly unfair trade 
practices which impose competition-restrictive effects that must be 
considered as potential abuses of dominant market position.8) 
It is worth noting that the POSCO decision delineated the proof needed 
to establish the subjective requirements. For example, while the Court 
placed the burden of proving the subjective requirement on the regulatory 
agency, the POSCO opinion presented different burdens of proof for 
different groups divided by whether the factual presumption from the 
effects of competition restraints is possible or not. This division does not 
seem to have a practical sense. There should be no fundamental difference 
between cases in which the subjective requirements are presumed in fact 
from the effects of competition restraints and the cases in which the 
existence of the subjective requirements must be decided by the 
comprehensive considerations of conduct and market. This is because it is 
doubtful that there are differences between the analysis of the effects of 
competition restraints and the comprehensive considerations of conduct 
and market.9)
One must also consider the fact that the POSCO standard shifts the 
8) See jeong hoyeoL, gyeongjebeob [economic LaW] 200 (Bagyeongsa, 2012) (discussing 
view that POSCO should be understood within confines of “refusal to deal” as abuse of 
dominant market position). But compare Lee & Joo, supra note 5, at 105-106 (POSCO judgment 
can be applied to exclusive abuse, not to exploitative abuse) with Hong Daesik, Sabeobjeog 
Gwanjeomeseo Bon Gongjeonggeolaebeob [Fair Trade Law from the Perspective of Private Law], 29(2) 
sangsabeobyeongu [commerciaL LaW revieW] 363 (2008) (arguing that POSCO must be applied 
to all types of abuses of market dominant position and that Korean Supreme Court has shown 
that POSCO ruling could be expanded to exclusive abuses).
9) Jeong Yeongjin, Daebeobwonui Sijanggyeongjee Daehan Cheolhagjeog Gonoe [Korean 
Supreme Court’s Philosophical Torment about Market Economy], beobLyuLsinmun [LaW daiLy], Dec. 
13, 2007 at 12 (Korean Supreme Court has taken effect-based approach based on POSCO 
requirement of proof of concerns of competition restraints).
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normal burden of proving subjective requirements from the regulated to 
the regulator. Specifically, the responsibility for proving the non-existence 
of the subjective requirement of competition restraints may be placed on 
the regulator through this switching of the burden of proof. Naturally, it is 
more difficult to prove the absence of subjective requirement than its 
existence, and such a legal proof structure itself may be a path that the 
regulated can use to avoid the responsibility despite not meeting the 
subjective requirement.
2. Legal Validity
The POSCO decision has impacted the judgment of the lower courts as a 
precedent relevant to illegal abuse of a dominant market position.10) These 
lower courts have held that subjective requirements must be satisfied in 
other types of alleged antitrust abuse besides “refusal to deal,” including 
claims pertaining to exclusive conduct11) and to conduct that harms the 
consumer’s interest12) which arise under Article 3-2, Clause 1, No. 5 of the 
MRFTA.
There has been much criticism of POSCO.13) One counter-argument is 
that, while it is appropriate to understand the intentions or objectives of 
competition restraints as material facts in deciding illegality, it is not a 
positive subjective requirement that must be established to prove 
illegality.14) Another criticism argues that the POSCO Court’s application of 
the doctrine of factual presumption was flawed due to the difficulty of 
recognizing the empirical or theoretical relationship between objectives and 
10) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Du17707, Apr. 8, 2010 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2008Du1832, Oct. 13, 2011 (S. Kor.).
11) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Du22078, July 9, 2009 (S. Kor.).
12) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Du1983, May 27, 2010 (S. Kor).
13) But see Lee Hwang, Posco Pangyeol Ihu Sijangjibaejeog Jiwi Namyonghaengwi Panlyeeseo 
Budangseong Pandanui Gyeonghyanggwa Jeonmang [Tendency and prospect of illegality decision in 
the abuse of market dominant position cases since POSCO judgment] in FiFth anniversary oF the 
Posco judgment 41 (ICR Center, Korea University School of Law, 2013) (noting that there are 
different degrees of criticism towards POSCO and presenting analysis that the request of 
subjective requirements has not been influenced negatively on regulations in practice). 
14) yang myeongjo, gyeongjebeobgangui [Economic Law LEcturE] 108 (Sinjosa, 2011).
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effects of the competition restraints.15) Other critics point out that the 
POSCO holding’s views on the subjective requirements were improperly 
based on a distorted comparative law understanding of US antitrust law 
and EU competition law.16)
It is rare for a competition legal system to demand subjective 
requirements prior to determining the illegality of an action arising from 
abuse of market dominant power. There are different ways to respond 
legally to the rise of a monopoly, as Article 2 in U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act 
shows. Those Article 2 provisions are intended to address and regulate the 
formation of monopolies. Furthermore, the regulations on attempting to 
monopolize assume a previous stage. In order to exclude a legitimate act 
such as a natural monopoly from an illegal act, it would be necessary to 
consider such subjective requirements, particularly where regulation might 
be necessary to prevent further monopolization. One such feature of U. S. 
antitrust law is that regulations calling for subjective requirements are still 
being maintained through U.S. antitrust law cases, if only passively by 
asking a direct demonstration of the subjective requirements. This 
characteristic could not be shared with the MRFTA in Korea with its 
regulatory framework which differs from the Sherman Act in important 
ways. Likewise, in Article 102 of the TFEU, which has a regulatory 
framework similar to the MRFTA, the abuse of a dominant market position 
is understood as an objective concept, and so subjective elements can be 
used only as a basis to judge it.
IV. Subjective Requirement and Competition Policy
1. Issues of Competition Policy
It will also be difficult to accommodate the Korean Supreme Court’s 
15) Lee Bongui, Leading Cases of Abuse Control in Korea, in the second snu comPetition 
Forum 104 (SNU Center for Competition Law, 2010).
16) sin donggWon, dogjeomgyujebeob [antitrust LaW] 180-182 (Bagyeongsa, 2011). See also 
Lee Hoyeong, Gongjeonggeolaebeobsang Sijangjibaejeogjiwiui Namyong Haengwiui Jaengjeomgwa 
Gwaje [The Issues and Tasks of the Regulations on the Undertakings with Market Dominant Power in 
Fair Trade Act], 104 justice 95 (2008).
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interpretation from a perspective of competition policy. Among other 
things, if the subjective factors are a part of the essential requirements in 
determining the illegality of the abuse, the predictability and clarity of the 
regulations will be reduced because of the difficulty of proving the 
subjective elements. In other words, the essential subjective requirements 
will likely increase the possibility that regulations may deviate from the 
appropriate regulatory level when considering the abuse of dominant 
market power. Also, the Korean Supreme Court’s holding denied the 
illegality of the abuse of market dominant power due to a lack of the 
subjective requirements. This shows that the problem of a false negative, 
rather than a false positive, has been raised.17) If the subjective requirements 
are required to prove illegality, the regulation range will be inevitably 
reduced.18) It may be questionable whether the reduced scope of such 
regulation is desirable.19)
On the other hand, if the regulators intervene excessively in determining 
whether the subjective requirements are met, such a requirement may 
result in an overextended regulatory scope.20) Based on the Court’s view 
that the subjective requirements could be proven only through the concerns 
about competition restraints without proving any effects of them, this 
possibility could be realized. Finally, the inclusion of the subjective 
requirements in the determination of any illegality may lead to enlargement 
or reduction in the scope of the regulation. In either case, it might be 
difficult to avoid a negative impact on the illegality judgment of the abuse 
of market dominant position.
Furthermore, because many types of unfair trade practices require 
competition restraints to prevent illegality, these characteristics may 
17) A false negative occurs where a competition authority incorrectly concludes that anti-
competitive behavior is not illegal. A false positive occurs where a competition authority 
incorrectly concludes that pro-competitive behavior is abusive. robert Whish & david baiLey, 
comPetition LaW 193 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).
18) See sin, supra note 16, at 182; gWb Kommentar 667 (Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-Joachim 
Mestmäcker ed., C. H. Beck, 2001).
19) See Lee, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that that POSCO does not appear to have caused 
any reduction in regulations on abuse of market dominant position since opinion was handed 
down).
20) See herbert hovenKamP, FederaL antitrust PoLicy: the LaW oF comPetition and its 
Practice 284 (Thomson/West, 2005).
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represent a basis for the essentiality of subjective requirements in deciding 
the illegality of conduct as an abuse of market dominant power. However, 
as we saw earlier, the addition of these requirements will not be desirable 
from the point of view of competition policy or even from a demand of 
logical necessity. Therefore, courts must be cautious in extending POSCO’s 
holdings to unfair trade practices beyond mere abuse of market dominant 
power.
2. Objectification or Non-Essentiality
In light of the foregoing, the POSCO Court’s views on the subjective 
requirement will be difficult to be apply both judicially and in the context 
of competition policy. The major questions arising from POSCO are not 
about simply considering the subjective requirement, but whether such a 
requirement is essential. There are insufficient grounds to justify the 
essentiality of the subjective requirement in deciding illegality, and such a 
legal theory is undesirable from a perspective of competition policy.
Accordingly, legal theories about the subjective requirement arising 
from POSCO should be modified, and judges and legal theorists must 
decide in which direction such modifications will move. One possible 
approach might be the objectification of the subjective requirement. That is, 
it may be possible that the subjective factors can be confirmed through the 
objective factors. This approach does not evade the position adopted by the 
Korean courts that requires proof of subjective factors and is not be 
contrary to the POSCO ruling, which is why it may not be a viable solution. 
There may also be a limit on the feasible methods for the objectification of 
subjective requirement. The Korean Supreme Court said:
Because it would be difficult to obtain the direct evidences of the 
agreement of cartel due to the nature of conduct, the court could not 
help taking the method proving the conduct by showing the indirect 
facts or circumstance facts.21) 
21) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Du6625, May 29, 2008 (S. Kor.).
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This view is consistent with POSCO’s holding that the objective factors 
would be substituted for the subjective factors. Above all, because 
objectification of the subjective requirement would be based on the same 
methodology as the POSCO requirement of proving the subjective factors, 
it would be difficult to consider the other method while suggesting more 
concrete objective factors that function as a mechanism of objectification 
capable of relaxing the essentiality of subjective requirement.22) It seems 
unlikely that these factors could be proven in court, so it is doubtful 
whether objectification can compensate for the problems presented by the 
POSCO holding. Also, the relaxation of essentiality could not be a 
meaningful alternative so long as the decision structure of illegality is 
maintained. 
Consequently, a reasonable approach is to deny the essentiality of the 
subjective requirement. 
Even if courts adhere to the principle that legal liability can be imputed 
to certain conduct consisting of both subjective and objective factors, as has 
been a legal dogma of long standing affected by principles of responsibility,23) 
such conduct must be evaluated objectively in accordance with the negative 
effect on competition mechanisms as the regulations on abuse in EU 
competition law. Subjective factors can be integrated into the process of 
objective evaluation of conduct. 
Of course, a court could be required to consider the subjective 
requirement in a manner comparable to litigation abuse.24) However, in 
such cases, the essentiality of the subjective requirement will emerge from 
exceptional circumstances, where it may not be satisfactory to understand 
the meanings of such conduct, only by the objective evaluation of it. 
22) See Lee & Joo, supra note 5, at 106-107 (discussing the view that Korean Supreme Court has 
responded to negative aspects arising from essentiality of subjective requirement in this way). 
23) See OECD, TraDE anD COmpETiTiOn: FrOm DOha TO CanCun 19-20 (2003) (pointing out that 
courts have not imposed strict sanctions on cartels, because they have been bound by the traditional 
principle of responsibility).
24) See Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v. Commission, 1998 ECR II-207 (EU competition law); 
see also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industry, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) 
(U. S. antitrust law) (holding that intent of competition restraints must be proven in litigation abuse 
cases).
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Therefore, the subjective requirements must be treated as discretionary 
considerations in competition law in principle.
V. Further Debate on the Subjective Requirement
1. Cartel Regulation and the Subjective Requirement
1) Cartel Regulation by TFEU Article 101
EU competition law, which explicitly stipulates the objective of 
competition restraints as the requirement for the cartel, provides helpful 
implications. “All agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market” pursuant to Article 101, Clause 1 (TFEU), which is the basis for the 
cartel regulation in EU competition law. In light of the prescribed methods 
of such provisions, the objective and effect of the restriction of competition 
constitutes an unlawful requirement in mutual alternative meaning.25) In 
other words, the objective and effect of competition restraints in this 
provision are not parallel requirements26) Therefore, proving the objective 
and effect must be premised on understanding about the mutual alternative 
relationship between both sides, and the need and level of analysis will be 
established from this understanding.
This understanding has been made manifest in the Guidelines on the 
Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (hereafter “the 81(3) Guidelines”) 
established by the EU Commission.27) Such guidelines clearly reveal that it 
is unnecessary to analyze the concrete effects of competition restraints if the 
25) arieL ezrachi, eu comPetition LaW 46 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010). European Court of 
Justice has taken a same position, paying attention to the expression ‘or’ in the provision. See 
Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 ECR 235, 249. 
26) ezrachi, supra note 26, at 46-47.
27) Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. C101/97 
[hereinafter 81(3) Guidelines]. This Guidelines are valid for the application of TFEU Article 
101 too.
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agreements demonstrate an objective of competition restraints.28) According 
to the 81(3) Guidelines, agreements with the objective of competition 
restraints have a high potential for restricting competition by their very 
nature. For example, price fixing or market division which results in 
reduction of output, price increase, and irrational allocation of sources may 
be a part of such the agreements.29) Whether or not the specific agreement 
has such an objective should be determined on the basis of a 
comprehensive analysis of the various elements. Through this analysis, the 
content of agreements and the objective intent pursued through such 
agreements should be considered by the court, as well as the context in 
which the agreements are applied and the actual behavior of the cartel 
participants. Although the agreements need not state explicitly the effects 
of competition restraints, the actual practical method of the agreements can 
help elucidate the substance of competition restraints by objective evidence 
as well. While the subjective intent of competition restraints could be the 
related evidence, it is not an essential requirement.30)
Furthermore, according to the 81(3) Guidelines, even if the agreements 
do not contemplate competition restraint “by object,”  by the legal 
evaluation of the object of the conduct, any incidental effects of competition 
restraints should be analyzed and not merely presumed. Analysis of such 
effects should consider both actual and potential effects. If it turns out that 
there are negative impacts on price, output, innovation or the variety and 
quality of the goods in the relevant market on the basis of this analysis, the 
effects of competition restraints will be recognized to that extent.31)
The examples of the competition restraints recognized “by object” have 
been usually the types classified as a hardcore cartel. According to the 81(3) 
Guidelines, hardcore cartels constitute a restriction of competition “by 
object” through means such as price fixing, output restriction, horizontal 
market division, resale price maintenance, and vertical area restrictions.32) 
28) 81(3) Guidelines, para. 20.
29) 81(3) Guidelines, para. 21.
30) 81(3) Guidelines, para. 22.
31) 81(3) Guidelines, para. 24.
32) 81(3) Guidelines, para. 23.
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Of course, because such a correspondence must not be absolute,33) an 
understanding of competition and competition restraints will be bound to 
vary according to the specific circumstances of the market and trading 
partners.34) In addition, the Leegin ruling35) changed the legal doctrine 
governing competition restraints from “per se illegal” to “rule of reason” 
with reference to the regulation on the resale price maintenance in the 
United States, a change that significantly impacted EU competition law.36) 
The types of cartels classified as rigid might be changed in accordance with 
the progress of the thinking on competition policy.
However, it is expected that the current methods of cartel regulation 
based on “by object” analysis and the effects of competition restraints in EU 
competition law will be maintained, so it is necessary to understand the 
meaning of this competition policy. First, so long as the acknowledgement 
of competition restraints “by object” excludes any analysis of the effects in 
principle, this legal approach may be basically similar to the “per se illegal” 
standard from US antitrust law. Price fixing, market division, boycott and 
tying which are all per se illegal under U.S. antitrust law correspond to 
hardcore cartels acknowledged “by object” in EU competition law. 
Therefore, it is possible to understand the method of cartel regulation “by 
object” in EU cases as the same approach of per se illegality in the United 
States.37) For example, in the BAT CF case, it was important to decide 
whether the agreements on trademark affect market division. The analysis 
of the effect of competition restraints was no longer necessary after the 
market division had been acknowledged.38) Such regulatory systematic 
33) ezrachi, supra note 26, at 77.
34) Case T-328/03 O2, GmbH & Co OHG v. Commission, 2006 ECR II-1231.
35) Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
36) See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/01, para. 106-107 (discussing 
Leegin’s influence on the EU competition law; See also Mart Kneepkens, Resale Price 
Maintenance: Economics Call for a More Balanced Approach, 28 euroPean comPetition LaW revieW 
656, 664 (2007).
37) See William E. Kovacic, Importance of the Effects‐Based Approach and the Rule of Reason 
in Compet i t ion Law 6 ( June 12 , 2012) , ht tp://boyanov.com/BNV_resources/
uploads/2012/06/Importance-of-the-effects-based-approach_Prof.-William-Kovacic.pdf 
(placing both ‘object-based’ and ‘per se illegal’ in similar category under the perspective of 
competition policy). 
38) Case 35/83, BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken v. Commission, 1985 ECR 363.
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characteristics could be understood to be overly formal, comparing the 
form-based approach and effect-based approach, with the goal of trying to 
extend the latter.39)
Also, it is necessary to note that the objective of competition restraints in 
Article 101, Clause 1 in the TFEU could be proven regardless of the specific 
subjective intention. Of course, as the 81(3) guidelines point out, specific 
subjective intent will be a meaningful evidence in proving the object of 
competition restraints, but this demonstration must not be absolutely 
dependent on it.40) Rather, as shown in the BIDS case,41) even if it is clear 
that the subjective intentions emerge regardless of the competition 
restriction, the object of competition restraints may be admitted on the basis 
of the acknowledgment of subjective intent by the nature of the agreement. 
Finally, the objective of Article 101, Clause 1 in TFEU is not comprised of 
specific subjective intentions about the undertakings. Rather, it can be 
understood as the concept inferred from the nature of the agreement within 
the framework of competition policy.
2) Subjective Requirement of Cartel in MRFTA
Article 19 Clause 1 of the MRFTA stipulates that “no entrepreneur shall 
agree with other entrepreneurs by contract, agreement, resolution, or any 
other means, to jointly engage in an act falling under the following 
subparagraphs, which unreasonably restrict competition or allow any other 
entrepreneur to perform such act.” With this provision, a cartel shall only 
be established by agreement, and the agreement will be prohibited if it will 
restrict competition without a justifiable reason. Furthermore, it is 
universally agreed that restriction of competition renders a cartel illegal. 
Consequently, it is unnecessary to consider the subjective requirements 
39) See Luc Peeperkorn & Katja Viertio, Implementing an effects-based approach to Article 82, 
comPetition PoLicy neWsLetter 20 (Nov. 2009); Damien Gerard, Effects-based enforcement of 
Article 101 TFEU: the object paradox (Feb. 17, 2012), KLuWer comPetition LaW bLog,  http://
kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2012/02/17/effects-based-enforcement-of-article-101-tfeu-
the-object-paradox/ (discussing analysis that ‘effect-based’ approach has yielded increase in 
EU Competition Law).
40) 81(3) Guidelines, para. 22.
41) Case C-209/87, Competition Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society, 2008 ECR 
I-8637.
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particularly.
KFTC’s regulation practices have shown the same attitude. In particular, 
this attitude could be found in the overall structure of the illegality 
determination presented in “guidelines on the cartel judging” (hereafter 
cartel guidelines) established by KFTC. Examination of the illegality of a 
cartel under the cartel guidelines will be made through an analysis of 
characteristics of the cartel and its market (stage 1), analysis of the 
competition restriction effect (stage 2), analysis of the effectiveness 
enhancement effect (stage 3), and fair comparison between the competition 
restriction effect and effectiveness enhancement effect (stage 4). In 
particular, the characteristics of a cartel in stage 1 will be decided based on 
factors such as the purpose of the cartel, the field covered by the cartel, its 
competition relation, and the subjective intention of cartel. But the 
subjective intention identified in these provisions does not mean the 
subjective requirements of the establishment of the cartel, and it may be 
considered as one among various factors related to cartel.
However, it is not easy to predict whether POSCO will have any 
influence on cartel regulations. Both the abuse of a market dominant 
position and a cartel are subject to regulatory systems based on competition 
restraints as the foundation of illegality. This common basis may lead to 
extension of the reasoning of POSCO to cartels. However, the above 
discussion on the essential subjective requirement of single conduct will 
raise doubts about the extension of POSCO’s ruling. There still remain 
questions on whether the POSCO holding is legally valid and is 
appropriate in light of competition policy.
2. Subjective Requirement in Criminal Law
It is possible to impose a penalty on an undertaking or actor who 
violates Articles 66-68 of the MRFTA, and those clauses which form the 
basis for the regulations also establish criminal penalties for violations of 
them. If it is a requirement to prove the existence of subjective requirements 
in order to determine the illegality of any abuse arising from a market 
dominant position under the POSCO rules, the meanings imposed by these 
requirements in establishing a crime could pose a problem for prosecutors.
Normally, a crime is established in a Korean criminal court when all the 
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requirements of facts, illegality, and responsibility (which will be examined 
in each stage) are met. In such a judicial structure, it will be important to 
determine at which stage the existence of subjective requirements implying 
the intent of competition restraints must be proven. The intention meaning 
acknowledgement or willingness of a criminal act will pursue the facts. The 
intentionally produced effects of restriction of competition will not be 
related to the facts but will be involved in the evaluation of the illegality. 
Consequently, the intent of competition restraints could not be understood 
as a content of the intention as the subjective requirement in the stage of 
facts. However, because the intent of competition restraints will be a 
question of fact necessary to prove illegality, it will be inevitable to 
understand the intent of competition restraints as a subjective requirement 
other than intention in Korean criminal law. 
If the intent of competition restraints cannot be understood as a 
requirement for a judgment of illegality under the POSCO rules, it might 
still be considered so within the area of responsibility from the perspective 
of the establishment of crime. In such a case, the legal theory of a possibility 
of expectation of legal action as the responsibility principle will be applied 
to the decision of responsibility. Under this legal theory, if the party 
engaging in the conduct lacked the intent or objective of competition 
restraints and such a subjective requirement were an essential element of 
the alleged crime, the subject could be exempted from criminal 
responsibility.42)
VI. Conclusion
The Korean Supreme Court ruled in the POSCO case that the intent or 
objective of competition restraints as an independent requirement must be 
considered when determining the illegality of a refusal to deal as an abuse 
42) Korean courts have had a strict attitude toward ‘mistake of law’(Verbotsirrtum). It 
will be difficult to acknowledge the possibility of avoidance of ‘mistake of law’ in view of 
such an attitude of the courts. See the BGH (German supreme court)’s decision that cartel 
participants’ proffered defense of ‘mistake of law’ might be cognizable as a legal principle but 
could not be accepted as a defense in that particular case. See 1966 BGHSt 21, 18, vom 27. 1 
(Ger.). See also voLKer emmerich, FäLLe zum WettbeWerbsrecht 38-39 (C. H. Beck, 2000)
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of market dominant position. Whether the POSCO ruling has legal validity 
and accords with the competition policy and whether this opinion will be 
applied to determining the illegality of the other MRFTA violations are 
important issues. In spite of a variety of criticisms of POSCO, the position 
taken by the Korean Supreme Court spelled out in the case has been 
maintained up to now. The exclusive types of abuse of dominant market 
position other than the refusal to deal may fall under the rule announced in 
POSCO, and as a result, further discussion of the subjective requirements of 
the violations of MRFTA is warranted.
The abuse of market dominant position has been understood as an 
objective concept under the TFEU, which is based on a regulatory system 
similar to Korea’s MRFTA, and the subjective requirements such as intent 
of the restriction of competition are not considered to be independent. It is 
critical to examine the objective characteristic of the conduct to harm the 
competitive situation in the market when competition is already restrained 
due to the existence of dominant undertakings. Meanwhile, the subjective 
requirements in the regulation to monopolize or attempt to monopolize 
found in Article 2, Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act are essentially 
considered, even if presumptions could be made regarding the other 
objective requirements. But those legal principles correspond to a differing 
regulatory system relating to monopoly power. Thus, there are limitations 
on how much the principles in U.S. antitrust law can be invoked when 
construing the MRFTA, at least in the area of regulating the abuse of 
dominant market position rather than dominant market position itself. 
Furthermore, it will be difficult to recognize the validity of considering 
essentially subjective requirements when determining the illegality of a 
cartel.
Even if the intent or objective of competition restraints might be an 
important consideration to take into account when assessing the illegality 
of such restraints, it is too formal to consider the subjective and objective 
requirements symmetrically and independently. It is important to clarify 
the objective meaning of the conduct in determining whether it may have 
an adverse influence on the competition in the market. Thus, the subjective 
requirement could contribute only towards understanding a conduct 
objectively in light of competition policy.
